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Twenty years ago, the theme of this conference, “Power and 
Authority in Eastern Christian Experience” would have been considered 
by many to be of interest primarily to historians and theologians, but not 
particularly relevant to the political discourse underway in many of the 
countries which traditionally formed part of the Eastern Christian world. 
As the Soviet Union began to collapse, its own constituent republics and 
the countries of the Eastern Bloc, comprising the historic core of the 
Eastern Christian world, began looking to the West, and particularly the 
United States, for their political models.
1
 The last Soviet president, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, and the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, 
attempted to emulate Western “economic and political practices”2 rather 
than turning to pre-Communist traditions and models. 
However, it was highly unrealistic that the majority-Orthodox 
nations of the formerly Communist world would automatically “meekly 
restructure their culture, society, politics and economy along the norms 
provided to them from the West.”3 Almost immediately there began the 
search for what S. Frederick Starr has labeled the “usable past”4—those 
traditions and elements rooted in the past that could help buttress new 
political and economic structures. In his study of how reform efforts 
were successful in Novgorod and other Russian regions, Nicolai N. Petro 
has concluded that it was when elites embraced a “positive political myth 
rooted in [the] past” that they successfully “eased the shock of cultural 
discontinuity, broadened the social constituency in favor of reforms, and 
                                                          
1 James H. Billington, The Face of Russia: Anguish, Aspiration and Achievement in 
Russian Culture (New York: TV Books, 1998, 1999), 236-237. 
2 Michael McFaul and Regine A. Spector, “External sources and consequences of 
Russia’s ‘sovereign democracy,” in New Challenges to Democratization, ed. Peter 
Burnell and Richard Youngs (New York: Routledge, 2010), 116. 
3 Nicolai N. Petro, “A Russian Model of Development: What Novgorod Can Teach the 
West,” in Civil Society and the Search for Justice in Russia, ed. Christopher Marsh and 
Nikolas K. Gvosdev (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 91. 




contributed to dramatically higher levels of confidence in local 
government.”5 
In the two largest Orthodox countries of the post-Soviet states—
Ukraine and the Russian Federation—there has been an ongoing search 
for inspiration from the past. Post-Soviet Russian leaders, particularly 
over the last ten years, have been interested in finding and applying 
useful precedents from their history and culture, holding conferences and 
workshops designed to plumb the past for useful insights.
6
  Vladislav 
Surkov, the deputy chief of staff to president Dmitry Medvedev, and one 
of the articulators of the ideology of United Russia, the ruling party, told 
United Russian party activists at a 2006 congress: "If a people cannot 
develop their own images and thoughts ... then they will have, in general, 
no political or cultural thought of their own ... We should have our own 
voice... We should have our own version of political language."
7
 To 
some extent, this search for roots in Russia is to help differentiate the 
Russian experience from that of Western Europe and North America; as 
Surkov observed, the “new democratic order arises from European 
civilization. But within this there is a specifically Russian version.”8 
Former president (and current prime minister) Vladimir Putin 
himself draws inspiration from the past as he charts policy; “the Russia 
he repeatedly invokes is a great, powerful, divinely ordained state that 
stretches back a thousand years.”9 Moreover, Russian elites acknowledge 
that part of that Russian inheritance is the East Roman (Byzantine) 
legacy—and the Byzantine experience is no longer seen as part of 
Russia’s curse (separating it from the Western world) but contains within 
it the seeds of Russia’s regeneration as a global power in the twenty-first 
century. As Nina Khrushcheva observed:  “Under Boris Yeltsin, the 
double eagle got little play, but in the Putin years its significance has 
come to equal that of the Communist red star. Byzantium and its symbols 
are discussed on talk shows, their imperial grandeur cited as an example 
for Russia's own future glory; Orthodox priests with distinguished beards 
                                                          
5 Petro, 44. 
6 For instance, in the area of foreign policy, the former foreign minister Igor S. Ivanov 
makes the case that post-Soviet Russia can and should learn from its past experiences, 
and cited some of the work being done by the ministry to examine the Russian past for 
guidance. Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2002), 4, 26-29. 
7 Quoted in Nikolas K. Gvosdev "Russia's Future," Orbis 53:2 (Spring 2009): 350. 
8 Vladislav Surkov, “Russian Political Culture: A View from Utopia,” in Russian 
Political Culture: A View from Utopia, ed. Konstantin Remchukov (Moscow: 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 2007), 7. 




read sermons on how Russia, if it is to achieve greatness, must look into 
its Christian predecessor's past.”10 In 2008 the documentary, “The 
Destruction of the Empire: a Byzantine Lesson,” authored and produced 
by Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov), a conservative cleric with close 
ties to the Kremlin, aired on Russian state television—and proved to be 
so popular that an encore was scheduled, along with an additional 
discussion—and provoked discussion and debate as to the appropriate 
uses (or misuses) of the Byzantine tradition. Yet among supporters and 
critics alike, what was striking about the film and the subsequent 
conversations it engendered was its attempt to make the historical past 
relevant to current conditions—especially in the way in which Emperor 




While Russia’s post-Soviet leadership has turned to imperial 
pasts—both Byzantine and Russian—for inspiration, in Ukraine, it is the 
legacy of the Cossack hetmanate (particularly the seventeenth-century 
hetmans like Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny , Bogdan Khmelnitsky 
and Ivan Mazepa)—which for centuries fought for autonomy and 
freedom for the Orthodox Church—which contemporary Ukrainian 
politicians cite as their inspiration.
12
 When he was inaugurated as 
president of Ukraine in January 2005, Viktor Yushchenko “also took the 
symbolic oath of hetman, or leader of Cossacks - the historic defenders 
of Ukraine against foreign oppression.” 13  In contrast to the anti-Western 
tinge that is associated with current Russian interest in the Byzantine 
                                                          
10 Nina L. Khrushcheva, “Lost in Byzantium,” Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2008, at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/01/opinion/op-khrushcheva1 [accessed December 23, 
2010]. 
11 “A Byzantine sermon,” The Economist, February 14, 2008, at 
http://www.economist.com/node/10701960?story_id=10701960 [accessed December 26, 
2010]. Basil II is praised for having created a “stabilization fund” to cushion the economy 
against shocks, for campaigning against “oligarchs” who sought to concentrate power at 
the expense of both the state and ordinary people, and struggling against “separatists” 
who sought to divide the empire. This led The Economist to note, “The film's usage of 
modern words and imagery is so conspicuous that the moral cannot escape a Russian 
viewer.” The film can be watched via this link: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VP9pMVaEuLE [accessed December 27, 2010]. A 
copy of the script is available (in Russian) at  
http://www.taganrog.orthodoxy.ru/index.php?id=5229 [accessed December 27, 2010]. 
12 Yushchenko, for instance, has called for the construction of a “Cossack capital” near 
the capital, to emphasize these linkages. “Yushchenko hoping for construction of 
'Cossack capital' outside Kyiv,” Kyiv Post, February 22, 2010, at 
http://www.kyivpost.com/news/city/detail/60142/print/ [accessed January 1, 2011]. 
13 “Yushchenko takes reins in Ukraine,” BBC News, January 23, 2005, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4198957.stm [accessed December 23, 2010]. 
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Empire, embracing the Cossack brotherhood (sich) is seen as a way for 
Ukraine to demonstrate its membership in the European and Western 
community of nations—but on its own terms. 14  To the extent that the 
hetmanate viewed itself as an Orthodox Christian commonwealth, an 
appeal to its traditions is also part of the process of reclaiming the 
Eastern Christian experience as something relevant to twenty-first 
century life and politics. 
One of the areas where the influence of the past can be observed 
is in relations between the Orthodox Church and the executive branch in 
both Russia and Ukraine. In the traditional conception of the relationship 
between Church and state in the East, the holder of the supreme 
executive power—the emperor, the prince, the tsar—enjoyed a privileged 
position within the Church; he (or in some cases, she
15
) was not simply 
an ordinary member of the laity. In the twelfth century, the canonist 
Theodore Balsamon, patriarch of Antioch, asserted that “Orthodox 
emperors have the right to teach Christian people and like priests burn 
incense as an act of worship to God.”16 Russian emperors, at the time of 
their coronation, entered the sanctuary to take communion, and explicitly 
claimed temporal headship over the affairs of the Orthodox Church 
within the boundaries of the empire (as per the decree issued by Emperor 
Paul I on April 5, 1797).
17
 Eusebius, in his Life of Constantine, set the 
pattern for considering the emperor as a quasi-hierarch of the Church, as 
its protector and benefactor, noting: “He exercised a peculiar care over 
the church of God: and whereas, in the several provinces there were 
some who differed from each other in judgment, he, like some general 
bishop constituted by God, convened synods of his ministers.”18 The 
                                                          
14 See, for instance, the comments made by former president Viktor Yushchenko about 
Hetman Ivan Mazepa. “Yushchenko calls for myth of Hetman Mazepa's treason to be 
dispelled,” Interfax, March 20, 2009, at http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/10291/ 
[accessed December 26, 2010]. 
15 Empress Catherine the Great of Russia, for instance, was addressed by Georgian 
Orthodox bishops as the “Mother of all Orthodox Christians”, the protector and 
benefactor of the Church. Cf. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Imperial Policies and Perspectives 
Toward Georgia, 1763-1819 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 28. 
16 Quoted in A. A. Vasiliev, A History of the Byzantine Empire, volume II (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin, 1958), 70. 
17 Daniel H. Shubin, A History of Russian Christianity,vol. III, The Synodal Era and the 
Sectarian, 1725-1894 (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), 87; see also Nikolas K. 
Gvosdev, Emperors and Elections: Reconciling the Orthodox Tradition with Modern 
Politics (Huntington, NY: Troitsa Books, 2000), 78. 
18 Chapter XLIV. A copy of Eusebius’ The Life of the Blessed Emperor Constantine is 
archived by Paul Halsall of the Fordham University Medieval Studies Center as part of 
the online Medieval Sourcebook, at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/vita-
constantine.html [accessed December 23, 2010].  
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secular ruler was also expected to use the power of his office to turn 
people to the “true faith” and to mediate to solve schisms when the 
hierarchs themselves were unable to bring about unity. The Russian 
Church reiterated this “special role” played by the Emperor; even as late 
as 1906, the Pre-Sobor consultation, in its “12th point”, declared: “The 
Emperor, being of the Orthodox faith, is the supreme patron of the 
Orthodox Church and the guardian of her well-being.”19 
While Cossack hetmans were not consecrated to their position, 
as heads of the Cossack brotherhood, they nevertheless also considered 
themselves to be protectors and benefactors of the Orthodox Church, and 
could influence the selection of hierarchs and the outcome of church 
councils. But perhaps the most important precedent for contemporary 
Ukraine was the role of the “chief executive” of the Cossack host in 
restoring an independent Orthodox hierarchy in Ukraine, after the 
existing bishops had agreed to the terms of the union with the Catholic 
Church in Brest in 1596. It was the hetman, Petro Konashevych-
Sahaidachny, who negotiated with Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem 
(and who threatened to deprive the patriarch of Cossack protection when 
traveling from Moscow back to the Ottoman Empire should he refuse the 
hetman’s request) who succeeded in getting Iov Boretsky consecrated as 
Metropolitan of Kyiv (Kiev) in 1620, as well as filling other vacant sees 
with Orthodox bishops.
20
 In addition, when dealing with competing 
ecclesiastical hierarchies (those who supported the Union of 1596 and 
those who were against it), the Cossack leaders could use their temporal 
authority to hand over parishes and monasteries to the control of the 
faction they supported
21—another precedent that has echoes in current 
developments in Ukraine. Having restored an Orthodox hierarchy in the 
ancient lands of Rus’, the Cossack hetmans did not then stand aside to let 
the Church run its own affairs but considered themselves the “lay 
protectors” of the Orthodox Church within their territories. 
Twenty years ago, the prevailing assumption was that the largest 
components of the traditionally Eastern Christian heartland had 
definitively entered into a post-Constantinian age and that political 
leaders would not seek to restore this earlier model of Church-state 
relations.
22
 The regime would no longer be the protector and sponsor of 
                                                          
19 Quoted in Dimitry Pospielovsky, The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia 
(Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998), 196. 
20 Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 109-116. 
21 Plokhy, 134-35. 
22 The Church-state status quo that had evolved in the East Roman/Byzantine realm in the 
fourth century, to some extent, set the “Orthodox norm” through to the modern age. As 
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the Church—as in the tsarist period—nor would it be the Church’s active 
opponent—as during Soviet times. From henceforth, Church and state 
would go their separate ways. The 1990 “Law on Freedom of 
Conscience” 23 envisioned a Church-state relationship based on absolute 
separation; there was no sense of Church and state forming a single, 
united commonwealth. Article 5, for instance, proclaimed that “all 
religions and denominations are equal under the law” and forbade “the 
establishment of any advantages of restrictions with respect to one 
religion or denomination over others.” In that same article, the Church 
was banned from participating “in the activity of political parties.” 
Article 17 permitted local councils to return property to the Church (or to 
set up long-term leasing arrangements) but did not mandate that the 
government had to provide restitution for real estate that had been seized 
from the Church after the Revolution. Article 29 was to transform the 
Council for Religious Affairs (at both the union and republican levels) 
from an instrument of control over the Church into an “informational, 
consultative and expert center.” The legislation adopted by the Russian 
Federation in that same year went even further, disbanding the Council 
for Religious Affairs and signaling the “complete nonintervention by the 
state in religious affairs.”24 
After the dissolution of the USSR, both Ukraine and Russia set 
themselves up, in constitutional terms, as secular republics, with the 
separation of church and state written into law, and no special status for 
the Orthodox Church. Article 35 of the Ukrainian Constitution 
proclaims: “The Church and religious organizations in Ukraine are 
separated from the State, and the school — from the Church. No religion 
shall be recognized by the State as mandatory.” Nothing in Chapter V—
which outlines the duties of the presidency—contains any reference to 
involvement in religious affairs, and while there is the requirement that 
the president have a command of the state language (Article 103), there 
is no religious test for holding office. Similarly, the Russian Constitution 
                                                                                                                                  
Alexander Schmemann observes, “The conversion of the Emperor Constantine resulted 
in the greatest change that the Church had ever undergone. Its significance was by no 
means limited to the altered relations between Church and state—the external conditions 
of Church life. Far more important were the developments in the mind of Christianity 
itself, the profound internal transformation that took place gradually in the Church 
community.” Alexander Schmemann, The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy, trans. 
Lydia W. Kesich (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 62. 
23 The text of the law was published in Pravda, October 9, 1990, 1. 
24 Mikhail Zherebyatev, “Revising Russian Religious Legislation,” Prism 8:4 (April 30, 
2002), at 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=20287&tx_
ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=224 [accessed January 2, 2011]. 
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proclaims: “Everyone shall be guaranteed the right to freedom of 
conscience, to freedom of religious worship, including the right to 
profess, individually or jointly with others, any religion, or to profess no 
religion, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious or other 
beliefs, and to act in conformity with them.”  (Article 28) As in Ukraine, 
there is no reference to any religious duties in the section on the 
presidency (Chapter IV). [In contrast, the Constitution of Greece (the 
Hellenic Republic) explicitly opens “In the name of the Holy and 
Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity” and proclaims (Article 3): “The 
prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of 
Christ.”] So, in constitutional terms, Russian and Ukrainian presidents 
have no formal rights or obligations vis-à-vis the Orthodox Church. 
In a post-Constantinian environment, the Church would be left to 
its own resources, and it would conduct its affairs without reference to or 
the involvement of the civil power. To paraphrase U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Hugo Black, under such conditions the government (and its 
officials) should not attempt to set up a church; to pass laws which aid 
one religion or prefer one religion over another; or to “openly or secretly 
participate in the affairs of any religious organization or groups.”25 
Yet the older notion, set forth by the Emperor Justinian in his 
famous Sixth Novella (535), that church and state should cooperate to 
establish harmony (symphonia) for the good of the commonwealth, 
continues to exert an influence on thinking among the hierarchs, some of 
the clergy and some political leaders in both Ukrainian and Russian 
society.  Church and state are not seen as separate institutions, but two 
types of authority--spiritual and secular--both charged with promoting 
the welfare of society. The classic ideal of "symphony," therefore, 
encourages the government to take a very close interest in the well-being 
of the national church, which in turn works for the benefit of the nation. 
It also means that the president is expected to take up some of the 
functions that, in the past, were exercised by Orthodox emperors, 
monarchs and other leaders. 
However, none of this is mandated by law. The extent to which 
Russian and Ukrainian presidents have assumed quasi-imperial/quasi-
hetmanal roles vis-à-vis the Church has depended on a number of 
factors: the president’s own personal faith and sense of commitment to 
the Church; his conception of the presidential role; and his assessment as 
to whether being seen as a protector and defender of the Church 
resonates with his political supporters and with the voters in general. 
Boris Yeltsin was respectful of the Church but not particularly pious. 
                                                          
25 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), 15-16. 
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While the Orthodox Church did succeed in gaining privileges and 
successfully lobbied his administration on a number of policy issues, 
Yeltsin accommodated the Church because he felt it helped him 
politically, not because he saw himself as continuing in the historic roles 
of the emperors and tsars.
26
  
In contrast, Vladimir Putin viewed himself as an active member 
of the Church but also saw the Church as part and parcel of the Russian 
system
27
--an attitude shared to some extent by his successor Dmitry 
Medvedev. Indeed, as Irina Papkova has concluded, “Medvedev is, by all 
accounts, an active parishioner in the Orthodox church to a higher degree 
than his predecessor V. Putin, inspired perhaps by Russia’s religiously 
activist first lady Svetlana Medvedev.”28 
Both Putin and Medvedev have used quasi-symphonic language 
to describe the relationship between Church and state, even when 
acknowledging the post-Constantinian outlook of the constitution. For 
instance, after the enthronement of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow in 2009, 
Medvedev proclaimed that the event “creates new conditions for a fully-
fledged … dialogue between the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
state.”29 In February 2010, Putin addressed the patriarch as follows: 
“Under your leadership, the dialogue of the Church with state and public 
organizations in the resolution of important social problems is notably 
expanding and is being filled with new content. The influence of the 
Russian Church and Moscow Patriarchate is growing not only in Russia 
but also abroad.”30 The moves towards a greater establishment of the 
Orthodox Church in Russia led one observer of the church-state 
relationship to conclude that both Putin and Medvedev have “willfully 
undermine[d] the constitutional principles of secularism, 
                                                          
26 John Anderson, “Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia,” 
Journal of International Affairs, 61:1 (Fall/Winter 2007): 186-187. 
27 Zoe Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia After 
Communism (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 128, 130. 
28 Irina Papkova, “From Tandemocracy to Triumvirate? Implications of the Election of 
Patriarch Kirill for Russian Domestic Politics,” paper presented at the 2010 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 11 at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641524 [accessed January 3, 2011]. 
29 “Medvedev: Kirill’s Enthronement Creates New Setting for Broader Dialogue Between 
Church and State,” Interfax, February 1, 2009, at http://www.interfax-
religion.com/?act=news&div=5655 [accessed January 6, 2011]. 
30 “Patriarch Kirill's first year: priests in barracks, religion in schools, better ties with 
Catholics,” RIA Novosti, February 1, 2010, at 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100201/157743960.html [accessed January 6, 2011]. 
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nondiscrimination and equality through a variety of special privileges, 
cooperation agreements and legislative initiatives.”31 
The first president of post-Soviet Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, 
was a former member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party 
who after Ukraine gained its independence threw his support behind the 
project of creating a distinct Ukrainian autocephalous Church 
independent of the Moscow Patriarchate, seeing this as part and parcel of 
the Ukrainian state- and nation-building project. His successor Leonid 
Kuchma, on taking office, distanced himself from this effort and issued a 
statement (July 29, 1994) pledging to uphold the separation of church 
and state and the strict neutrality of the Ukrainian state towards religious 
questions.
32
 The next two presidents of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko and 
Viktor Yanukovych, have both presented themselves as faithful sons of 
the Orthodox Church, but with very different jurisdictional allegiances; 
Yushchenko to the Orthodox groups which have separated themselves 
from Moscow, and Yanukovych to the jurisdiction of the Moscow 
patriarchate—and both have used their position as president to extend 
favor and support to their preferred choice.
33
  
The Case of Russia 
While post-Soviet Russian presidents are often compared to the 
tsars of old, particularly given the vast panoply of powers that they 
wield
34
, for the most part, they have not claimed the symbolic and 
liturgical roles of the former emperors. When Boris Yeltsin, the first 
president of post-Soviet Russia died, he was buried using the office 
prescribed for any ordinary member of the laity. Andrei Zolotov 
observed that “the Book of Psalms was read overnight, as befits laymen, 
over Yeltsin’s coffin by Moscow seminarians – and not the Gospels, as 
tradition prescribes for priests and the emperor.” However, in a 
conscious echo of past practice, Yeltsin was identified by his title 
(president) and his name and patronymic, instead of the formula “the 
                                                          
31 Robert C. Blitt, “One New President, One New Patriarch and a Generous Disregard for 
the Constitution: A Recipe for the Continuing Decline of Secular Russia,” Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 43 (2010): 1339. 
32 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics and Social Change in East-Central 
Europe and Russia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 257. 
33 Paweł Wołowski, “Patriarch Kirill in Ukraine – the servant of God in the service of 
politics,” EastWeek 26:19 (August 4, 2010): 2. 
34 See, for instance, Dmitri Trenin, “Putin-Medvedev Double Act is Prelude to Either 
Reform or Marginalisation,” The Scotsman, December 31, 2009, archived at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24418 [accessed 
January 8, 2011], for reference to the president as a new type of tsar. 
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servant of God Boris”, which, as Zolotov also noted, “used to be 
reserved solely for royalty. That’s how the emperor and his immediate 
family were commemorated in the liturgy before the revolution – by their 
name and patronymic. It has never been done since then.”35 
Neither Putin nor Medvedev has asked for or been extended the 
privileges of being able to enter the sanctuary area to make their 
offerings, which Canon LXIX of the Sixth Ecumenical Council “in 
Trullo” (691) permits to the emperor, nor have either played any 
liturgical function such as censing the icons, bestowing blessings or 
preaching to congregations
36
--with one notable exception; President 
Putin did speak at the ceremony in Christ the Savior Cathedral, at the 
church service, which proclaimed the reunion of the Moscow 
Patriarchate with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in 2007, 
declaring: “Unity of the Orthodox Church is the necessary precondition 
for unity across the entire Russian world.”37 Neither president has ever 
been escorted inside the altar area to observe services. For Christmas 
services in January 2011, prime minister Putin, attending the small 
village church of the Intercession of the Mother of God in the village of 
Turginovo in the Tver region, simply stood in the midst of the 
congregation. President Medvedev and his wife, First Lady Svetlana 
Medvedev, stood on the right side of the ambo in Christ the Savior 




Yet, in other areas, the imperial legacy is being imitated. One of 
the roles of the emperor was to mend schisms within the Church. As 
president, Yeltsin played no role in facilitating talks between the 
Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of 
Russia, which had split in the 1920s over disagreements as to how to deal 
                                                          
35 Andrei Zolotov, “Boris Yeltsin’s Last Contribution to Building a New Russia,” 
Europaica Bulletin, 120, May 16, 2007, at http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/120.aspx#3 
[accessed January 8, 2011].  
36 These were functions that Byzantine emperors did exercise; cf. Deno J. Geanakoplos, 
“Church and State in the Byzantine Empire: A Reconsideration of the Problem of 
Caesaropapism,” Church History 34:4 (December 1965): 390-391. 
37 “80 years on, Putin blesses the end of the schism within the Russian Orthodox 
Church,” AsiaNews.it, May 17, 2007, at http://www.asianews.it/news-en/80-years-on,-
Putin-blesses-the-end-of-the-schism-within-the-Russian-Orthodox-Church-9291.html.  
38 Photographs of the president and prime minister at services were published by United 
Press International, at :  http://www.upi.com/News_Photos/News/Medvedev-attends-
Orthodox-Christmas-service/4421/2/ [accessed January 8, 2011], and footage of the 
events was broadcast by ITN courtesy of the Telegraph newspaper, at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8245454/Vladimir-Putin-
celebrates-Christmas.html [accessed January 8, 2011]. 
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with the reality of Soviet control of Russia. Nor was ending the schism a 
priority for his administration, and the talks dragged on for years. 
In contrast, Putin took an interest in this question, and appears to 
have played a pivotal role in helping to end this division.  While talks 
between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church 
Outside of Russia had been reaching accord on many issues, and the 
decisions by the Moscow Patriarchate to canonize the imperial family as 
“passion bearers” and to recognize more of the “new martyrs” lost during 
Soviet times met key demands of the exile Russian church, most 
observers credited Putin with playing “a key role in facilitating 
reunification.”39  In particular, the event that many believe broke the 
logjam was the 2003 meeting between Putin and the hierarchs of the 
exile jurisdiction. The Russian president told the assembled hierarchs and 
senior clergy: “I want to assure all of you that this godless regime is no 
longer there. You are sitting with a believing president.”40  One is left 
with the impression that the event which cemented the reunion was the 
declaration of faith made by the Russian president. Certainly Patriarch 
Aleksii II gave credit to the Russian president, noting that “President 
Vladimir Putin's meeting with Metropolitan Laurus in New York in 2003 
greatly contributed to the reunification efforts, showing to ROCOR that 
‘not a fighter against God, but an Orthodox Christian is at the country's 
helm.’”41 
In a post-Constantinian world, the faith preferences of the chief 
executive of a secular republic shouldn’t matter to hierarchs working to 
solve an internal Church schism. Putin’s declaration of faith in New 
York, however, hearkened back to the decree issued by the Moscow 
Council of the Russian Orthodox Church on December 2/15, 1917, “On 
the Legal Status of the Russian Orthodox Church”, which declared that 
the “head of the Russian state … must belong to the Orthodox Church.”42 
Another imperial role that Putin and Medvedev have seemed to 
adopt is that of patron and benefactor of the Church. Again, the contrast 
with Yeltsin is indicative. Yeltsin certainly extended a number of favors 
and benefits (such as the return of some property and tax concessions) to 
                                                          
39 See, for instance, press coverage, such as David Holley, “Russian Orthodox Church 
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the Orthodox Church, but did so from his sense that aiding the Orthodox 
Church was part and parcel of rebuilding the country’s moral and ethical 
framework so as to sustain liberal-democratic principles, that support for 
Orthodoxy helped to advance the repudiation of the Soviet past, or out of 
political calculations. The latter was the driving force behind Yeltsin’s 
ultimate acceptance of the 1997 “Law on Religious Freedom” which 
modified the 1990 legislation by creating a two-tiered system of faith 
communities in Russia, with “traditional” communities like the Orthodox 
Church enjoying more benefits and privileges and “new faiths” facing a 
series of restrictions on their activities; Yeltsin fought this legislation for 
years and even vetoed it when it first passed the Russian Duma in 1997 
but ultimately concluded that it was politically safer to sign it into law, 
which he did in September 1997.
43
  
His successor, Vladimir Putin, both as president and as prime 
minister, has been a more enthusiastic proponent of church-state 
cooperation in advancing the common interests of the Russian 
commonwealth. Addressing Church leaders during a reception to 
celebrate the 1020
th
 anniversary of the baptism of Rus’, Putin declared: 
“The state will continue to support the initiatives of the church aimed at 
strengthening civil and interregional accord, its social, cultural, 
educational and charitable mission. …. It was the position of the Russian 
Orthodox Church that contributed to the creation of the Russian state 
both as a multinational and a multi-confessional one.”44 This has 
continued during the Medvedev administration. During his 2010 visit to 
Russia, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople 
commented on this shift, telling Medvedev, “We are happy for the 
flourishing, very successful cooperation of the Russian Orthodox church 
and the state. The Russian leadership and the leadership of the Russian 
Orthodox church have written a new page in history.”45 
In three areas, Putin and Medvedev have given the Church far 
more than it received during the Yeltsin period. During the Yeltsin 
administration, the school system remained resolutely secular; now, a 
“religious culture and secular ethics” course, which highlights the role 
Orthodoxy has played in the formation of Russian society, has been 
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introduced “in an experimental fashion” in nineteen regions of Russia as 
part of the federal curriculum, and Medvedev has signaled he supports 
the addition of a voluntary “Orthodox component in the federal public 
school curriculum.”46 While this is not a return to the mandatory 
Orthodox catechism classes that existed in Russian schools in pre-
revolutionary times, the Church, after years of lobbying, has managed to 
gain a foothold in the public school system.  
Under the Yeltsin administration, clergymen were permitted to 
minister to the armed forces or to state institutions, but did so at their 
own resources. The Church requested that formal chaplains—paid as 
government officials---be reinstated, and in July 2009 a presidential 
decree issued by Medvedev authorized  “providing priests already 
ministering to the armed forces state salaries, effectively opening the 
door for the introduction of the military Chaplaincy.” In March 2010, 
responding to direction from both the president and the prime minister, 
the Ministry of Defense began to define the legal status of chaplains; 
chaplains are to be assigned to units based on the “preferences of 
individual army units”, which in essence will favor the Orthodox Church, 




But the most significant and wide reaching “gift” has had to do 
with property. The 2010 Russian Federal Law “On the Restitution of 
Religious Property” (signed into law by President Dmitry Medvedev on 
November 30, 2010) provides for both real estate and movable property 
that had once belonged to the Church which is now in public ownership 
to be either transferred back to the Church’s ownership or for the Church 
to have “free use” of it.48 This is not merely a symbolic gesture. As one 
news report concluded, “Real estate analysts have said that given the 
value of land in Moscow and other cities, the law could put the Church in 
the league of the gas and railroad monopolies, Gazprom and Russian 
Railways.” Prime Minister Vladimir Putin made the decisive push to get 
the Economics Ministry—which had been drafting legislation since 
2007—to complete its work, and has also tasked the Culture Ministry to 
begin work on related legislation that would allocate state funds to 
                                                          
46 Papkova, 24. 
47 Papkova, 26. 
48 As noted on the website of the president of the Russian Federation, November 30, 
2010, at http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/1395 [accessed December 22, 2010].  
184 
 




While these steps do not amount to establishment of the 
Orthodox Church as the state church—and in theory other religious 
groups (such as Jews or Muslims) can avail themselves of these 
provisions, they do reflect a major shift in the position of the Church in 
Russian society. What is interesting, however, is that these steps—on 
education, on restoring chaplains, and on the return of property—did not 
arise from “pressure from below”, that is, from demands being 
articulated by a broad base of society. Instead, they were initiatives taken 
by state leaders who wished to bestow these benefits on the Church. 
Patriarch Kirill himself noted, one day after the bill on restoring Church 
property was signed into law, that the measure did not have grass-roots 
support. 
Speaking with members of the Synodal Department for Relations 
between State and Society in Moscow, the Patriarch expressed 
disappointment at the reaction of society to the new course of relations 
between the Church and the Kremlin. "In the field of relations between 
church and state there are no longer any questions of principle that 
remain to be resolved . . . All three outstanding issues - the presence of 
religion in schools, the clergy in the army and the return of property 
illegally confiscated from the Church – have been resolved. " Yet 
something is still missing: the broad support of society for those goals. 




Some have raised the point that a Church that is dependent on 
the executive power for its privileges and position will be overly 
supportive of whatever initiatives the secular power puts forward. The 
Russian Orthodox Church certainly does not find itself supporting the 
political opposition to the Putin-Medvedev tandem and, citing non-
interference in secular political matters, does not challenge the swath of 
domestic and foreign policies implemented by the government. But there 
are limits to what the presidency can demand of the Church when it 
comes to matters that are deemed as touching directly on the Church’s 
competencies. One question—again with echoes from Byzantine 
history—has been relations with the Church of Rome. 
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Although Putin has always considered himself a faithful 
Orthodox Christian, he was also in favor of improved relations with the 
Vatican, as part of an overall strategy of improving Russia’s relations 
with Europe. His outreach to the Pope of Rome—Putin visited Pope John 
Paul II in 2000 and 2003 and Pope Benedict XVI in 2007—did strain his 
relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate.
51
 In his meetings with the 
Catholic pontiff, the Russian president did not limit the discussions to 
“secular” matters but did raise the subject of the relationship between the 
Churches; his foreign policy aide Sergei Prikhodko noted after the 2007 
Putin-Benedict meeting, “The president favours improving relations 
between the two Churches."
52
 In 2009, Medvedev also met with 
Benedict, and upgraded Russia’s relations with the Vatican, permitting 
the Catholic Church to have an apostolic nuncio in Moscow.
53
 
But there are also limits to what the president could do. Neither 
Putin nor Medvedev have been able to compel the Russian Orthodox 
Church to issue a formal invitation to the Pope to visit Russia, a sine qua 
non for any papal visit, nor could they force the pace of Orthodox-
Catholic dialogue. While the Russian president was willing to start a 
process, the presidential administration made it clear that he would not 
involve himself as a “middleman” in intra-Church dialogue.54 This also 
points to other areas where the Russian president, although assuming 
some “imperial” functions, falls short of taking up the full mantle of the 
tsars vis-à-vis the Church. In the post-Soviet period, the Russian 
Orthodox Church does not turn to the president for permission to 
convene councils or confirm their actions (a routine practice in Byzantine 
and tsarist practice).
55
 The Moscow Patriarchate has made it clear it 
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absolutely opposes the restoration of any sort of State Council for 
Religious Affairs or tsarist-style ministry for church matters to supervise 
the Church.
56
 Most significantly, neither Putin nor Medvedev has the 
ability to appoint the patriarch or otherwise “steer” the election. Indeed, 
in 2009, after the death of Patriarch Aleksii, there were clear signals that 
the Kremlin wanted to see Metropolitan Kliment of Kaluga, a leader of 
the traditionalist camp and someone considered to be “more ‘willing to 
be subservient’ to the government’s interests”, become the new patriarch, 
instead of Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and the head of the 
Department of External Church Affairs, who ultimately was elected. 
Moreover, president, Putin had appointed Kliment, rather than Kirill, to 
be the Church’s representative to the “Public Chamber”, an advisory 
body to the president.
57
 
So the Russian president has only partially imitated his imperial 
predecessors, and what has emerged today is an odd hybrid of 
expectations drawn from the past of how a Russian leader ought to relate 
to the Orthodox Church combined with the continued legal supremacy of 
the notion of the secular state. 
 
The Case of Ukraine 
 
After Ukraine achieved independence in 1991, the Orthodox 
Church on its territory splintered into competing jurisdictions. The bulk 
of parishes and priests remain part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of 
the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), the only jurisdiction recognized as 
canonical by the established patriarchates; returning émigrés repatriated 
the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) to Ukrainian 
soil; with the backing of Ukraine’s first post-Soviet president, Leonid 
Kravchuk, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-
KP) was set up, combining some of the UAOC communities with ex-
Moscow-Patriarchal communities; and there are some smaller splinter 
jurisdictions which also claim to be the authentic Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church. While most parishes and priests remain affiliated with the UOC-
MP, the allegiances of Ukrainians are much more fluid.  While each 
jurisdiction has its core membership (polling data indicates that 15.4 
percent of Ukrainians identify as members of the UOC-MP, 11.7 percent 
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as members of the UOC-KP, and 0.7 percent as members of the UAOC), 
more than half of Ukrainian Orthodox decline to specify “which” 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church they are members of.
58
 
The fluidity of the situation of the Church in Ukraine has created 
conditions which make it difficult for presidents to assume a post-
Constantinian stance and in fact invite imitation of imperial and hetmanal 
precedents. Frank E. Sysyn asserts: “Neutrality in Orthodox affairs is, in 
fact, an impossible goal for the Ukrainian central or regional 
governments . . .”59 Not surprisingly, therefore, despite the formal 
constitutional proclamations of the separation of church and state, 
Ukrainian presidents have often become directly involved in Church 
affairs. 
Given the divisions in Ukraine among the Orthodox—meaning 
that no hierarch commands the allegiance of all the faithful—the 
president has, at times, assumed a quasi-liturgical role in “national” 
celebrations, such as Ukrainian independence day. For instance, 
President Yushchenko dispatched his brother, Pyotr Yushchenko, to 
Jerusalem to obtain the “Holy Fire” at Pascha; the holy light was then 
brought to St. Sophia Cathedral to be given to the president, who then 
passed it to the representatives of the different jurisdictions. The 
president would also deliver a Paschal address to the nation at St. 
Sophia’s.60 
The first president of post-Soviet Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, 
having been the Ukrainian Communist Party’s secretary of ideology 
during the Soviet period, was well aware of the importance of having a 
national, autocephalous Orthodox Church as part of his state-building 
project (as well as the historical precedents set by the Cossack hetmans), 
but distrusted the émigré Ukrainian Orthodox who were already 
attempting to set up a separate Ukrainian jurisdiction. He was already 
close to the exarch of Ukraine for the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan 
Filaret (Denysenko), who had, in 1990, become the head of the UOC-
MP, the autonomous Orthodox Church in Ukraine affiliated to Moscow. 
Kravchuk appealed to Patriarch Aleksii of Moscow to grant full 
autocephaly to the UOC-MP in March 1992, but this request was denied 
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and Filaret was ordered removed from his position.
61
 Faced with these 
setbacks, Kravchuk then encouraged Filaret to reach out to the Ukrainian 
Autocephalists and brokered an uneasy union between bishops, clergy, 
and communities leaving the Moscow Patriarchate and the UAOC to 
create the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) on June 25-26, 1992. Using his 
position as president, Kravchuk was able to favor the UOC-KP in terms 
of encouraging members of the UOC-MP and UAOC to join the new 
jurisdiction, returning property (such as the historic St. 
Vladimir’s/Volodomyr’s Cathedral and St. Michael’s Monastery in 




Having been stymied by Moscow, Kravchuk then focused on 
lobbying Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in 1993 to recognize the 
legitimacy, canonicity and autocephaly of the UOC-KP. The Ukrainian 
Council for Religious Affairs, under Arsen Zinchenko, a presidential 
appointee, also worked to lobby for the interests of the UOC-KP.
63
 
Kravchuk, however, ran into some limitations. He could use the 
power of the presidency to engineer a union of the UAOC with Filaret 
and his defectors and to influence the selection of Filaret as the deputy to 
Patriarch Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), an émigré hierarch who had been 
enthroned in 1990 as the head of the UAOC and who then became the 
first head of the UOC-KP. But Kravchuk did not succeed in getting 
Filaret elected as patriarch in 1993 when Mstyslav died nor could he 
prevent part of the UAOC from repudiating the union and recreating 
their separate jurisdiction. Most importantly, given that most priests and 
parishes remained part of the Moscow Patriarchate, Kravchuk could not 
simply proscribe the UOC-MP. Indeed, growing hostility to his 
presidency from the Russophile southern and eastern parts of Ukraine 
were a contributing factor to the defeat of his 1994 bid for re-election.
64
 
His successor, Leonid Kuchma, seemed to adhere to a much 
more post-Constantinian view of his role as president. In 1995 he 
expressed his opinion that “as an individual”, he would “be happy if the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church were united. But as President, he opposes 
attempts to create a "state church" (he was referring to the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate). The President also said he 
had no authority to intervene and would not intervene in conflicts 
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between the different branches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church …”65 
Significantly, he took the decision to preserve the “neutral” status of the 
historic eleventh century St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, claimed by all 
Orthodox jurisdictions (as well as the Eastern-rite Catholics) by 
confirming its status as a museum.
66
 
In his second term, however, in order to consolidate his position 
and gain maneuvering room vis-à-vis Russia, he began to play the 
Church card. At times he spoke about the importance of having a united 
Ukrainian autocephalous Church as part of state-building, linking this 
back to the hetmans and the project of Bogdan Khmelnitsky.
67
 At other 
times, he seemed to endorse a formal “split” in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, 
creating two churches—the UOC-MP and uniting the UOC-KP and the 
UAOC under the Patriarch of Constantinople.
68
 Rather than leaving 
negotiations “up to the Church,” Kuchma involved the Council for 
Religious Affairs, sending its chairman, Viktor Bondarenko, to visit 
Moscow and Istanbul and to hold talks in Zurich. Filaret, who had 
succeeded in being elected as patriarch in 1995, complained, “We do not 
know what was discussed at those talks, but the fact that they were held 
behind our back testifies that some murky business is being done.”69 
The 2004 presidential race further politicized the Church 
situation, because the UOC-MP came out very strongly in favor of 
Viktor Yanukovych. It meant that the ultimate winner of the elections, 
Viktor Yushchenko, who had attended a UOC-KP parish during the 
1990s, was less likely to assume Kuchma’s earlier stance of neutrality. 
As Frank Sysyn concluded, “Although Yushchenko consistently declared 
after the elections that the state should not determine religious issues, the 
new Ukrainian government has to face the reality that a major Orthodox 
church tied to a center in Russia had campaigned against it.”70 Moreover, 
Patriarch Filaret was actively lobbying for direct state involvement, for 
the president not to assume a post-Constantinian role. He declared, 
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“[T]he important positive factor is that the president really wishes to 
have a single Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church… This problem can and 
must be resolved by a Unifying Church Council involving all Ukrainian 
supporters of the Local Church, including patriotically— minded 
Orthodox believers who are now members of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church-Moscow Patriarchate. I think that such people exist, and that they 
will attend this council, but only if the state facilitates the project.”71 At 
the beginning of his term, Yushchenko pledged to church leaders that he 
would commit the government to efforts to resolve the issues dividing 
Ukraine’s Orthodox faithful. The head of the presidential administration, 
Oleksandr Zinchenko, held meetings with Bartholomew in Istanbul in 
2005.
72
 During his term, Yushchenko continued his efforts to negotiate 
with both the Ecumenical Patriarch as well as with the Russian Orthodox 
Church to facilitate creation of a separate, autocephalous Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church around the UOC-KP.
73
 When Bartholomew visited 
Kyiv in 2008, the president openly appealed to him: “I believe that a 
national self-governing church will emerge in Ukraine, and I ask your 
holiness for your blessing for our dreams, for truth, for hope, for our 
country.”74 
Yushchenko’s advocacy for an autocephalous Church and his 
patronage of UOC-KP and UAOC churches (although he would also 
attend UOC-MP churches as well) led the UOC-MP to assign blame on 
the president for the continuation of the schism. The president’s choice 
of church was not considered to be a private matter, and, as a spokesman 
for the UOC-MP noted, “A leader who accepts sacraments with 
schismatics isn't only a participant in the schism, but also a teacher of 
schisms.”75  
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Yushchenko, however, could not force a definitive resolution of 
the church question, in part because after 2005, Ukraine’s political 
system was in turmoil. Political forces supportive of the UOC-MP, 
notably the Ukrainian Party of Regions, became the majority in the 
Ukrainian Rada (parliament). Compounding this problem was the falling 
out between Yushchenko and his former prime minister, Yuliya 
Tymoshenko, fracturing the so-called “Orange bloc” which had tended to 
support the question of Ukrainian autocephaly. 
In 2010, Yushchenko was defeated in his attempt to win a 
second term; Tymoshenko then lost the second round of the presidential 
race to Yanukovych, and Yanukovych’s forces also secured a narrow 
majority in the Rada. The shift in Ukrainian politics has also affected the 
churches, with the Kyiv Patriarchate, which formerly enjoyed the 
patronage of the “Orange coalition”, because President Yanukovych has 
made no secret of his preference for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of 
the Moscow Patriarchate, to the extent of excluding rival Orthodox 
jurisdictions from official events, such as his inauguration or the prayer 
service on Independence day.
76
 When he was inaugurated, Yanukovych 
invited only Kirill of Moscow to preside at the service of blessing, 
sending no invitations to the heads of other Ukrainian Orthodox 
jurisdictions.
77
 In summer 2010, the government also allowed Kirill to 
hold an exclusive service at St. Sophia’s, retreating from the “neutrality” 
which permitted only “ecumenical” services at which all Ukrainian 
jurisdictions would be represented. Yanukovych, who received the 
highest decoration of the Moscow Patriarchate (the order of St. 
Vladimir), has made it clear that he would not offer government support 
for the project of setting up an autocephalous Ukrainian church and 
would not seek to negotiate with Moscow or other Orthodox 
patriarchates on the UOC-KP’s and UAOC’s behalf.78  
Before leaving Ukraine, Kirill and the UOC-MP noted that 
nothing should stand in the way of other Ukrainian Orthodox groups 
from seeking reconciliation with the Moscow Patriarchate. This 
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apparently has been interpreted by some to mean that the policy of the 
Yanukovych administration is to encourage reunification under the 
UOC-MP. More recently, the Kyiv Patriarchate, has accused regional 
leaders, taking their cues from President Yanukovych, of encouraging 
clergy affiliated to the Kyiv Patriarchate to join the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (using police raids to pressure the 
recalcitrant) and denying Kyiv Patriarchate clergy access to public 
facilities—echoing the charges made by the UOC-MP against the 
Kravchuk government in 1992-1993.
79
  
The campaign by Kravchuk to create the Kyiv Patriarchate (in 
1992-93) and the alleged efforts by Yanukovych to seek its dissolution 
today have precedents in Cossack history. In 1625, Cossacks used force 
to ensure the “undivided possession of Kyiv for the Orthodox” and to 
drive out clergy who favored the Union.
80
 But it also reflects that 
hierarchs of both the UOC-KP and the UOC-MP have not embraced a 
post-Constantinian separation of church and state for Ukraine, and expect 







In both Russia and Ukraine, the older patterns have re-emerged, 
but there is also no attempt to slavishly imitate the past. John Anderson 
labeled the church-state relationship in post-Soviet Russia as 
“asymmetric symphonia”—and the extent to which Ukrainian and 
Russian presidents choose to emulate past emperors, hetmans or tsars in 
how they relate to the Orthodox Church is very dependent on whether the 
president is sympathetic to the Church
82—and there is no guarantee that 
in the future, new chief executives could come to power determined to 
implement a post-Constantinian system. But at present, the symphonic 
model continues to exert its influence. 
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